COMACO application to resource degradation:? wildlife snaring and illegal hunting

In addition to looking at natural resource management in terms of soil improvement and lessening the rate of deforestation, a central goal of COMACO has been to preserve the natural resource of wildlife.? Markets linking sustainable agricultural practices to wildlife conservation should not only preserve existing wildlife tourism revenue streams, but also make possible new economic opportunities.? It should be stressed from the onset, that COMACO offers a complement to traditional Zambian Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) activities, not a duplication.? In contrast to wildlife law enforcement, which inflicts a ?cost? on those found guilty of violating a resource protection law, COMACO seeks to impart economic benefits to individuals for relinquishing destructive practices and adopting more rewarding ones that help increase wildlife production.? From its inception, COMACO recognized a high degree of household dependency on wildlife snaring as a way of coping with food shortages.? Illegal hunting with guns (classical poaching) is a livelihood practiced by an unknown number of Valley residents.? Although we are still investigating the full extent of both forms of poaching, they represent a serious enough threat to Zambia?s resources and revenues that in the Valley alone there is an annual anti-poaching law enforcement budget of over $400,000.

a)Addressing the snaring threat

Given that the majority of people who use snares do so primarily to exchange wildlife meat for starch-based foods which they were unable to grow themselves (2001 baseline survey result, data not shown), COMACO actively linked its food security interventions with a request to farmers that as their food security improved, they reciprocate by surrendering snares.? This request became a common theme for COMACO?s initial use of World Food Programme maize.? Farmers were asked to surrender snares in exchange for maize as they were trained in conservation farming, giving them an opportunity to recognize the relative value of conservation farming to sustain food needs as opposed to relying on snares.

Although the use of WFP maize introduced an immediate benefit for surrendering snares, the increased production of food crops and ultimately the increased income associated with COMACO trade benefits were intended to discourage future use of snares.? Two measures were used to assess potential reduction of snare use: 1) actual count of snares surrendered and 2) household surveys that assessed dependence on snares for meeting food security needs.?

From 2001 to 2005, a total of 20,368 snares were surrendered by farmers from the COMACO core areas and an additional 9,386 snares were handed over by farmers from COMACO extended areas, as listed in Table 6.? More than 80% of the total snares surrendered from the core area were handed over by the end of the 2003-2004 farming season.? In the extended areas, the program of snare recovery did not begin until 2003.

In October 2003 a survey was conducted in the COMACO core area to assess current household snaring behaviors versus memory of their previous use in 2000.? This provided a means of determining effect after nearly three years of snare removal by COMACO.? Accuracy of responses was encouraged by the good will generated through COMACO?s intensive community participation, and recognition that during this period, no punitive action was taken by ZAWA or any other agency against those who had surrendered snares. This created a more trusting environment for conducting a survey in which households were asked to divulge illegal activities.? For data validation internally within the survey, questions were asked to indicate both personal practices, as well as respondents? perception of practices of others in the village.? Respondents perceived that in 2000 approximately 4 households out of 10 of their neighboring households depended on snares to help meet food shortfalls (Figure 8, mean = 4.2; S.D. = 2.86). Box-whisker plots in these panels again show the distribution of the data as well as the mean, with the same quantiles as in previous figures. Approximate accuracy of this perceived value was suggested by an even larger percentage of respondents saying that they personally used snares in this fashion (Figure 9a).? The mean number of animals caught per person snaring in the year 2000 was 5.75 (data not shown; S.D. = 7.84).? Based on these results, an extremely conservative estimate is that between 4000-6000 wild animals were lost to snares during that year.? This figure does not take into consideration losses to people living outside the Game Management Areas, nor does it include losses to ?professional poachers? who used firearms (see below).?

In comparison, significant declines in perceived and admitted snare use were noted by 2003.? A full 50% of respondents (Figure 8) indicated that they believed that no one was snaring in 2003, and less than 10% of respondents indicated that they themselves continued to snare.? Interestingly, out of those still snaring, there was a significant decrease in mean number of snares placed per snaring effort (Figure 9b; mean value of 4.75, S.D. = 4.8 versus 2.46, S.D. = 1.82; p< 0.001).? This suggested that if snaring were indeed primarily a coping mechanism for food insecurity, than increases in food security were helping to restrict this practice.

However, it could plausibly be argued that respondents were induced to give ?favorable? responses so that the COMACO business structure was continued.? In order to validate trends in snare use in a way external to the participants themselves?particularly that removal of snares was not being compensated for by obtaining new snares from outside the Valley?one form of ?proxy data? was obtained. These would indicate trends in snare use in the absence of reliable means of quantifying ?cheating? by snare replacement.? Questionnaires were administered to safari hunting clients who provided an objective assessment of snares encountered while legally hunting in the areas in which COMACO operated [Note:? in the Chikwa chiefdom, the professional hunting guide provided the data instead of the clients for 2005.].?

In 1999 and from 2003 ? 2006, a total of 269 hunting clients were surveyed for this information.? Table 7 gives a comparison between years prior to COMACO (1999) and during the COMACO intervention (2003 ? 2006), of the average annual percentage of these safari-hunting clients who complained of snare use during their hunt.? Three of the four hunting areas, Chikwa, Chifunda and Mwanya, showed dramatic decreases in snare complaints during the initial stage of COMACO, with Chikwa area having no complaints throughout the period up to 2006. ?Chanjuzi area, which represents two chiefs? areas, Chitungulu and Kasembe, showed a reduction and then replacement, indicating that cheating did indeed begin to occur, but varied between chiefdoms.? This trend has become widespread in 2006 with large increases in client complaints over snares encountered for all areas.? This represents an anomaly of expected results, given the increase in food security and the expected reduction in snaring to follow from improved food security. ?????

Table 7. Percentage contrast of safari clients who complained about encountering snares prior to and during the COMACO intervention
Year	Chikwa	Chanjuzi	Chifunda	Mwanya
1999	15%	50%	17%	62%
2003	0%	0%	0%	30%
2004	0	83	11	25
2005	0	50	10	27
2006*	63%	No data yet	43%	50%
* These date are preliminary as clients are still hunting

 

 

 

 

 

These results also suggest a possible flaw with the model itself if COMACO cannot exact the level of economic pressure to make it compelling enough for farmers to resist snaring voluntarily.? One approach COMACO is considering is to seek help from other stakeholders, such as Zambia Wildlife Authority and safari operators, both of whom benefit from COMACO through increased animal license sales and private sector transactions, respectively.? Each could add an extra $0.10 per kg of commodity sold to COMACO if there respective conditions of no snares found by clients on safari or by scouts on patrol were met.? Total costs to both for a given year in a particular hunting area would be approximately $1500, but the return would be higher survivorship of those species whose economic value is far more than $1500.? By adding an extra $0.20 if both stakeholders were to agree, farmers would gain substantially, approximately 20% of the farm-based income, provided all members of the community were committed to legal market incentives and resisted snaring.? COMACO will attempt this modification of the model in 2007.

b)????? Addressing the illegal hunting threat

Using the lure of COMACO markets and extension services, local illegal hunters were offered an amnesty to surrender their firearms and participate in a program that provided free training in skills for alternative income-earning options and the necessary inputs to pursue these options.? Traditional leaders were asked to assure their local hunters that the program was not a trap and to encourage them to find a livelihood, that unlike poaching, did not risk limiting community revenues from the legal sale of wildlife hunting licenses. Under the COMACO model, natural resource management and land use behaviors are expected to change in favor of conservation-based practices when the economic benefits outweigh benefits of adopting practices contrary to conservation.? This hypothesis was put to a formal test with the implementation of this program, called the Poacher Transformation Program (PTP).

The basic steps of PTP included:

• Identification of hunters and formation of local groups who agree to surrender all their firearms and join this program (average group size = 5)
• Two of the five attend a 6 ? 8 week course in selected skills intended to promote income and food security
• The two attendees return to their group and spend 1-2 weeks sharing their skills with their fellow group members
• A complete set of tools and inputs, valued at about US$300, are provided to the group
• COMACO extension staff visit the group twice a year and help facilitate market opportunities through COMACO?s trade linkages
• Continued follow-up and training are provided to build confidence and income security

During the course, participants engage with a number of instructors who share with them their views about the risks of illegal hunting and relative benefits of legal professions and sound natural resource management strategies.? Within context of this training and continued dialogue, trust develops between participants and instructors.? At the end of the course, a senior instructor known to all the participants administers a verbal questionnaire individually to each participant to assess the hunter?s profile.? Some of the results from this questionnaire are summarized below in Table 8:

From its inception in 2002, the total number of hunters who have participated in this program across the entire COMACO area is 299 ( see Figure 10 for spatial distribution).? For the COMACO core area, total number of poachers transformed from 2002 to 2006 for each Chief?s area is given in Table 9 and of this number, all but 6 (7%) have remained fully compliant with the condition that they cease all illegal hunting activities to be eligible for benefits provided by COMACO. ?This determination is derived from periodic visits to the ex-poacher?s home, typically three times per year, and the monitor questions neighbors, local government works and other people deemed fit to provide trustworthy information.

From a 2001 sample of 19 poachers residing in the core area (interviewed in the home of their village headmen who guaranteed them anonymity from any incriminating information they might provide), average annual income from illegal use of wildlife was $210 and from non-wildlife legal sources, total annual income was $95.?? In 2006, 35 transformed poacher residing in the same area, representing about 41% of the total sample of transformed poachers, were interviewed to obtain annual income, which equaled $198 per hunter.? These figures suggest that while average total income remains approximately 35% less than total income as an illegal hunter, income from legal livelihoods has risen by over 100%.? The small number of transformed poachers who have quit the program to return to illegal hunting is a strong indication of the program?s success in reducing illegal hunting threats in Luangwa Valley.? Assuming these hunters previously hunted for at last 3 months per year, total number of animals saved by supporting illegal hunters with alternative livelihoods is in excess of 1290 animals/year.?

Table 9.? Number of transformed poachers by by Chief?s areas for the COMACO core areas
Chifunda	Chikwa	Kazembe	Chitungula	Mwanya
29	24	12	9	12

 

 

An independent validation of the programs impact on presence of active illegal hunters in the COMACO core area was the results of patrol data collected by the Zambia Wildlife Authority for the period from 2002 to 2005 (see Table 10), which showed a 10-fold decrease in poacher encounter rate by scouts on short day patrols from 2002 to 2005.

Table 10 .? ?ZAWA East Luangwa Area Management Unit patrol data for 2002 to 2005
?	2002	2003	2004	2005
Total arrests	135	169	103	68
Total long patrol	157	190	169	100
# arrests per long patrol	0.860	0.889	0.609	0.680
Total day patrol	111	419	537	477
# arrests per day patrol	1.216	0.403	0.192	0.142

 

 

 

 

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